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ABSTRACT 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) caused thousands of deaths, national and global panic, 
and immediate action by the federal government to protect the borders of the United States of 
America (USA) from terrorism. In response to these attacks, the United States (U.S.) government 
enacted laws for law enforcement agencies to protect against terrorist activities. Law 
enforcement agencies are effective in combating terrorism, but their measures contain a major 
flaw - the improper use of race in profiling to address national security and public safety 
concerns. Racial profiling is an ineffective measure for preventing terrorism. There are solutions 
to correct this flaw through reconstructing training and implementing policies for all law 
enforcement agencies. The intent of this thesis is to discuss the history and the effectiveness of 
profiling in U.S. post-9/11 counterterrorism through theoretical research of peer-reviewed 
journals and articles, relevant laws, and United States Supreme Court cases to offer solutions to 
the problems racial profiling presents. The discussion will generate a search for new ways law 
enforcement agencies could conduct daily counterterrorism operations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Racial profiling is ineffective in preventing terrorism. Historical accounts of racial 
profiling include the internment of Japanese-Americans in WWII, the profiling of African-
Americans and Hispanic-Americans in the War on Drugs, and the profiling of Middle Eastern-
Americans in the War on Terror. These events show racial profiling is not capable of preventing 
all the crimes it sets out to stop. The effectiveness of racial profiling is not well-documented, but 
evidence of it is present in the research.  
Law enforcement officers (LEOs) have had the responsibility of reducing crime and 
protecting the American people throughout the course of U.S. history.1 LEOs needed to increase 
their level of surveillance, investigation, and enforcement due to planned and imminent threats 
during World War II (WWII), the War on Drugs, and the War on Terror. LEOs have also taken 
preventive measures to reduce a perceived threat before its execution.2 These preventive 
measures include information sharing and analysis, threat recognition, terrorist interdiction, and 
any other terrorism prevention activity authorized.3 Profiling is another of the preventive 
measures.  
                                                 
1 A LEO, for purposes of this thesis, is any person who creates, interprets, and enforces laws, regulations, and 
legislation to maintain public order and safety in the USA through the laws that govern their authority. 
 
2  K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for 
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 120. 
 
3 A terrorist, for purposes of this paper, is any person who is involved in acts dangerous to human life that violate 
federal and state law, appear intended to (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy 
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping, and occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., 18 U.S.C. § 2331; 
Terrorism Prevention, 6 U.S.C. § 607 (Aug. 3, 2007). 
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LEOs profile when they investigate people solely for being of the same race, following 
the same religion, or possessing the same identifiable characteristics as someone who has 
committed a serious or deadly crime.4 Racial profiling has become more acceptable and 
justifiable in light of continuous terrorist threats.5 Advocates of racial profiling believe 
minorities commit most criminal activities, including drug offenses and terrorist attacks, 
implying race determines conduct.6 Some may also believe racial profiling is effective for 
national security because public statistics show particular crimes are committed disproportionally 
by certain members of particular groups.7  
Historically, race is a characteristic of who has committed a crime.8 However, many 
times race is a variable used primarily to predict and prevent crime, which is ineffective. For 
example, the internment process of Japanese-Americans included the relocating and 
concentrating of people to a collection location based upon race. After, surviving Japanese-
Americans were given restitutions because the government realized the internment was not the 
                                                 
4 Middle Eastern is a nationality not a race. However, in many countries including the U.S. Middle Eastern is used 
as a race. For example, the U.S. Census’ definition of the race white is a person having origins in any of the original 
peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa. Many would not refer to someone Middle Eastern as white, 
they would simply say Middle Eastern to describe their race. For the purposes of this paper, Middle Eastern is a 
race. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, Race, (1997), https://www.census.gov/topics/population/race/about.html.  
 
5 Racial profiling, for purposes of this paper, relies on race, ethnicity, or national origin and not behavior or 
information to identify an individual as being, or having been, engaged in criminal activity. Sophia E. Harris, 
Seeking out Terrorists: Will Racial Profiling do?, 36 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 249, 1 (2005). 
 
6 K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for 
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 120. 
 
7 Refer to limitations sections of this thesis, 41-42. 
8 K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for 
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 120. 
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way to address the Japanese spy concern.9 More recently, using race to identify African-
Americans and Hispanic-Americans as drug traffickers in the War on Drugs has failed to fully 
prevent the problem. Between 2000 and 2014, the number of overdose deaths from prescription 
drugs and Opioid pain relievers has tripled, from Benzodiazepines have quadrupled, and from 
heroin have quintupled.10 In the War on Terror, LEOs are using the classification of Middle 
Eastern to identify the group who commit most terrorist acts in the U.S. Racial profiling those 
who appear to be Middle Eastern is invalid and presents a geographical limitation because there 
are 40 countries with cells of Al-Qaeda ranging anywhere from Malaysia to the Philippines to 
Latin America.11 Profiling will also denigrate and intimidate an entire community of those who 
may be categorized as Middle Eastern.12 
 This thesis begins with an interpretation of the history of racial profiling in WWII, the 
War on Drugs, and the War on Terror. A historical overview of the use of racial profiling in U.S. 
national security efforts provides insight on the influences in current counterterrorism operations 
and references for future decisions. Next, it will discuss laws and U.S. Supreme Court cases 
addressing racial profiling. Then, it will discuss the effectiveness of racial profiling through 
terrorist diversity and consistency. Finally, recommendations are provided for how to maintain 
national security without racial profiling through reforms in training and policies. 
                                                 
9 Kimberlee Candela, Japanese American Internment, SALEM PRESS ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 2016). 
10 NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, Overdose Death Rates, (Dec. 2015), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-
topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates.  
 
11 K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for 
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 120. 
 
12 Id. 
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HISTORY OF PROFILING AND NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 
The attacks that occurred on 9/11 shocked the American people. That day, they realized 
the need for heightened security everywhere, especially at airports, because of a different type of 
terrorism the U.S. federal government was unprepared for. Four planes and 19 individuals, later 
identified as Middle-Eastern militants of the Islamic extremist group Al-Qaeda, conducted 
terrorist acts that killed more than 3,000 people.13   
Less than two weeks after the terrorist attacks, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge 
became the first Director of the Office of Homeland Security in the White House. On November 
22, 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, which made the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) an independent, cabinet-level department.14 As a result, the DHS was 
able to coordinate, and unify comprehensive national security strategies to safeguard the country 
against terrorism and respond to future attacks. 
 The DHS’s vital mission is “to secure the nation from the many threats we face.”15 The 
vital mission branches off into homeland security missions. Two missions that combat terrorism 
are to (1) prevent terrorism and enhance security and (2) secure and manage our borders.16 In 
addition, they specifically focus on maturing and strengthening the homeland security enterprise 
                                                 
13 HISTORY, 9/11 Attacks, http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks.  
 
14 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, (Sep. 24, 
2015), https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security. 
 
15 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, About DHS, (Jul. 21, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs.  
 
16 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Our Mission, (Jul. 13, 2015) http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission. 
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itself.17 The three responsibilities of missions (1) prevent terrorism and enhance security and (2) 
secure and manage our borders are cited below: 
(1) prevent terrorism and enhance security (a) prevent 
terrorist attacks, (b) the unauthorized acquisition, importation, 
movement, or use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
materials and capabilities within the United States, and (c) reduce 
the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and key resources, 
essential leadership, and  major events to terrorist attacks and other 
hazards.18  
(2) secure and manage our borders (a) effectively secure 
U.S. air, land, and sea points of entry, (b) safeguard and streamline 
lawful trade and travel, and (c) disrupt and dismantle transnational 
criminal and terrorist organizations.19 
 
The ways DHS fulfills the missions are through the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA), improving screening for passengers, preventing terrorist travel, and 
enhancing the screening process for cargo and baggage.20 The DHS implemented these measures 
to reduce the immediate threat of more attacks and largely relied on the use of racial and 
religious profiles of the 9/11 terrorists.  
On one end of the spectrum, some Americans believe that although these methods may 
violate civil liberties, they are justified because of national security concerns and public safety.21 
                                                 
17 Id. 
 
18 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Prevent Terrorism and Enhance Security, (Jul. 20, 2015), 
http://www.dhs.gov/prevent-terrorism-and-enhance-security.  
 
19 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Secure and Manage our Borders, (Sept. 24, 2015), 
http://www.dhs.gov/secure-and-manage-borders. 
 
20 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Preventing Terrorism Results, (Jul. 21, 2015),       
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/preventing-terrorism-results. 
 
21 Sam Howe Verhovek, Americans Give into Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 23, 2001), at A1 (noting that a 
CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll taken a few days following the September 11 attacks revealed that 58% supported 
targeting passengers of Middle Eastern descent); Henry Weinstein et al., Racial Profiling Gains Support as Search 
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On the other end of the spectrum, some Americans believe these programs further invade 
privacy, mask racial profiling, and violate civil liberties. According to a 1999 Gallup Poll, only 
19% of respondents favored racial profiling.22 Twelve days after 9/11, Gallup conducted a 
similar poll and 58% of respondents supported racial profiling used to target people of Middle 
Eastern descent.23 Surprisingly, some of the respondents were Americans who, themselves, had 
been subjected to racial profiling prior to 9/11. In 2006, Gallup conducted a poll asking this 
open-ended question “Are there any security measures currently used in airports that you think 
should be stopped because they are not effective in preventing terrorist attacks? [Which 
measures do you think should be stopped?]”24 Only 2% of the participants responded that they 
were against racial profiling. 70% of participants responded that no measures should be 
stopped.25 In a more recent poll Gallup conducted in 2010, they surveyed 1,023 individuals 
asking “Some people have suggested that airline passengers who fit the profile of terrorists based 
on their age, ethnicity, or gender should be subjected to special, more intensive security checks 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tactic, L.A. TIMES, (Sept. 24, 2001), at A22 (68% of polled respondents favored targeting passengers of Arab 
descent). 
 
22 Frank Newport, Racial Profiling is Seen as Wide-spread, Particularly Among Young Black Men,  
GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, (Dec. 9, 1999), http://www.gallup.com/poll/3421/racial-profiling-seen-widespread-
particularlyamong-young-black-men.aspx. 
 
23 Sam Howe Verhovek, Americans Give in to Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 23, 2001), at A1. Henry Weinstein 
et al., Racial Profiling Gains Support as Search Tactic, L.A. TIMES, (Sept. 24, 2001), at A22. 
 
24 GALLUP, Terrorism in the United States, (2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/4909/Terrorism-United-
States.aspx?g_source=racial%20profiling&g_medium=search&g_campaign=tiles%27. 
 
25 Id. 
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before boarding U.S. flights. Do you favor or oppose this practice?”26 71% of individuals were in 
favor of this practice.27 
During WWII with the internment of Japanese-Americans, followed by the War on Drugs 
with Hispanic-Americans and African-Americans, and the War on Terror with Middle Easterners 
there has been controversy in the way LEOs were given discretion in the treatment of minority 
groups.28 During these times of heightened national security, laws were enacted that impacted 
these minority groups and legally supported racial profiling by LEOs, regardless of the 
disadvantages to counterterrorism operations.  
The U.S. Department of Justice issued guidelines on racial profiling that prevented the 
use of race in routine domestic investigative procedures. However, it allowed for particular 
suspect descriptions incorporating racial characteristics.29 For example, racial profiling is stating 
the possible suspect of a grand theft auto is a black man leaving a suburb area off Interstate 4 
because only 2/50 homes in the subdivision are owned by black families. However, it is not 
racial profiling to state, based upon an eyewitness account, the suspect is an unfamiliar African-
American male who was seen driving a vehicle, owned by a neighbor, out of a suburb area off 
Interstate 4. The second statement is using race to describe a suspect who has been seen 
                                                 
26 Susan Page, Poll: Most Support Ethnic Profiling in Air Security, USA TODAY, (2010), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-01-12-poll-terrorism-obama_N.html.  
 
27 Id. 
28 Leone, R.C., The Quiet Republic: The Missing Debate about Civil Liberties after 9/11, In R.C. Leone & G. Anrig. 
Jr. (Eds.), The War on Our Freedoms: Civil liberties in an Age of Terrorism, NEW YORK: PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1-22 
(2003); Reddick, S.R., Point: The Case for Profiling, INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 79, 154-157, (2004); 
Reitzel, J., & Piquero, A. R., Does It Exist? Studying Citizens’ Attitudes of Racial Profiling, POLICE QUARTERLY, 9(2), 
161-183 (2006). 
 
29 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Fact Sheet Racial Profiling, 6, (Jun. 17, 2003), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf. 
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committing a supposed crime, and not predicting who may commit a crime. Appearance does not 
equal the crime.  
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) guidelines state general enforcement 
responsibilities should be carried out without any regard to race. Also, stereotyping certain races 
as having a greater predisposition to commit crimes should be absolutely prohibited.30 Some of 
the DOJ guidelines are stated as follows: 
The guarantee to all persons of equal protection under the 
law is one of the most fundamental principles of our democratic 
society. Law enforcement officers should not endorse or act upon 
stereotypes, attitudes, or beliefs that a person's race, ethnicity, or 
national origin increases that person's general propensity to act 
unlawfully.31   
 
Other guidelines do not prohibit the use of racial profiling in combating terrorism. The 
following excerpts are from the guidelines set forth by the U.S. Department of Justice: 
In investing or preventing threats to national security or 
other catastrophic events (including the performance of duties 
related to air transportation security), or in enforcing laws 
protecting the integrity of the nation’s borders, federal law 
enforcement officers may not consider race or ethnicity except to 
the extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.  
Given the incalculably high stakes involved in such 
investigations, federal law enforcement officers who are protecting 
national security or preventing catastrophic events (as well as 
airport security screeners) may consider race, ethnicity, alienage, 
and other relevant factors.  
                                                 
30 K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for 
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 120; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Fact Sheet Racial Profiling, 1, 2-3, (Jun. 17, 
2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 
31 Deborah Ramirez, Jack McDevitt, and Amy Farrell, A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection 
Systems: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, (2000), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/184768.pdf. 
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Because terrorist organizations might aim to engage in 
unexpected acts of catastrophic violence in any available part of 
the country (indeed, in multiple places simultaneously, if possible), 
there can be no expectation that the information must be specific to 
a particular locale or event to a particular identified scheme.32 
It is challenging for LEOs to determine the most appropriate boundaries with which to 
properly apply the use of race in an investigation or interrogation because these guidelines are so 
broad. This type of profiling is allowed as long as it occurs under the exception for national 
security and public safety.33 There is no restriction on how specific the information or imminent 
a threat must be before racial profiling can be appropriately used.34 There only must be a credible 
threat and these threats are frequent.35 This has created an environment conducive to the 
unchecked use of racial profiling. There is an ongoing threat of racial identifiers being abusively 
used due to the lack of precise language on the limitations of racial profiling. In order to 
overcome the challenge, lessons from history should be learned and policies should be revised. 
Evidence has been used to support racial profiling, instead of allowing evidence to lead to the 
conclusion that racial profiling is an efficient and effective way to provide national security. 
World War II 
After the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. became involved in WWII and the 
government began the internment of Japanese-Americans into camps. On February 19, 1942, two 
                                                 
32 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Fact Sheet Racial Profiling, 5, (Jun. 17, 2003), 
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/June/racial_profiling_fact_sheet.pdf. 
 
33 Id. at 1. 
 
34 K. Sheik Pal, Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure after September 11: A Suggested Framework for 
Analysis, KENNEDY SCHOOL REVIEW, 119, 124. 
 
35 Id. at 125. 
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months after the attack, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 for 
the camps. The order was fueled by fear, race prejudice, and a rumor that Japanese-Americans 
sabotaged the war effort and assisted in the attacking.36 It was one of the first public displays of 
the U.S. government’s use of racial profiling of a group of people based upon the actions of a 
few. More than 110,000 Japanese-Americans were placed in one of 10 relocation centers for the 
duration of the war.37  
Most of the Japanese-Americans who were relocated were first generation immigrants 
who legally immigrated, but were prohibited from becoming a citizen through naturalization. 38 
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, it was not proven to have been carried out by Japanese-
Americans. If the intent of the internment of Japanese-Americans was to prevent them from 
assisting the Japanese from attacking, it is questionable that a mass internment of Japanese-
Americans in Hawaii was not done.39 During WWII, one-third of Hawaii’s population was of 
Japanese descent. The government later offered minimal restitutions to the surviving internees 
for the ineffective and morally wrong act of racial profiling. 40 
In Michelle Malkin’s book, In Defense of Internment: The Case for “Racial Profiling” in 
World War II and the War on Terror, she provides information supporting the internment of 
                                                 
36 Eric Foner and John A. Garraty, The Reader’s Companion to American History: Japanese-American Relocation, 
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN HARCOURT PUBLISHING COMPANY, (1991), http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/japanese-
american-relocation. 
 
37 Executive Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943). 
38 Kimberlee Candela, Japanese American Internment, SALEM PRESS ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 2016). 
 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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Japanese-Americans. Based upon her information, messages to and from the Japanese were 
being intercepted.41 The messages were about the help the Japanese were receiving in 
California.42 To an extent, the internment may have been justified because of what was and was 
not known during WWII. However, internment is still an extreme version of racial profiling.  
The Internment of Japanese-Americans is similar to the War on Terror because the 9/11 
hijackers were men from the Middle East who were Muslim extremists with connections and 
training in the U.S. All people who fit the hijackers’ description in the U.S. were required to 
report themselves or be referred for questioning. The initial reaction, to an extent, was 
appropriate because the people detained matched the descriptions of those who committed the 
attacks. However, the continuous classification well after the attacks is not warranted. 
War on Drugs 
The War on Drugs began in the 1970s and is still being combated today. President 
Richard Nixon created the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) through an executive order 
in July 1973 in response to the increasing number of drug activity in the U.S. and globally.43 The 
order established a single unified command to combat “an all-out global war on the drug 
menace.”44 Although in current times it is overshadowed by the War on Terror, the War on 
                                                 
41 Malkin, Michelle, In Defense of Internment : The Case for “Racial Profiling” in World War II and the War on 
Terror, REGNERY PUBLISHING (2004). 
 
42 Id. 
 
43 DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, DEA History in Depth: 1980-1985, http://www.dea.gov/about/history/1980-
1985.pdf. 
 
44 Id. 
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Drugs, especially in the beginning, was heavily dependent on the pairing of criminal and racial 
profiling. 
On March 24, 2016, the Cable News Network (CNN) released a 22-year-old interview 
that former Nixon domestic policy chief John Ehrlichman gave to Harper’s Magazine writer Dan 
Baum. This report shows how profiling was used to support an idea instead on an idea being 
supported by evidence showing profiling is necessary. The published article cites what John 
Ehrlichman said: 
The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House 
after that had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people… 
You understand what I'm saying? We knew we couldn't make it 
illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the 
public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with 
heroin. And then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt 
those communities ... We could arrest their leaders, raid their 
homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night 
on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? 
Of course, we did.45 
 
In general, criminal profiling is the practice of describing a person who has committed a 
particular criminal act, thereby equipping law enforcement officers with investigative 
mechanisms and information leading to the offender being apprehended.46 Criminologists use a 
variety of classifications known as typologies to capture the basic components of a crime.47 The 
criminal typologies serve multiple purposes. However, they are primarily used to simplify social 
                                                 
45 Tom LoBianco, Report: Aide Says Nixon’s War on Drugs Targeted Blacks, Hippies, CNN POLITICS, (Mar. 24, 
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/23/politics/john-ehrlichman-richard-nixon-drug-war-blacks-hippie/. 
 
46 Brown, N.D. and Newman, D.W., Historical Overview and Perceptions of Racial Profiling in an Era of 
Homeland Security, CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REVIEW, Volume 20 Number 3, 362 (2009). 
 
47 McCorkle, R.C. and Miethe, T.D., The Anatomy of Dangerous Persons, Places, and Situations, CRIME PROFILES 
SECOND EDITION, 2 (2001). 
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reality by identifying homogenous groups of crime behaviors that are different from other 
clusters of crime behaviors.48 These classifications are used to increase the understanding of 
shared features of criminal events and effectiveness of current crime prevention strategies. Crime 
typologies are focused on one or several of the following elements: (a) criminal behavior, (b) 
offender attributes, (c) victim characteristics, and (d) situational context.49  
The focus of crime typologies should be the criminal behavior, the situation, the victim 
characteristics and then the offender attributes. For example, if a LEO were to say “A homicide 
was committed on the corner of 5th and 6th avenue. Video footage shows the suspect is a white 
male, about 69 inches tall, with a buzz cut, wearing a blue hoodie and black shorts who may 
show signs of prior injuries.” The details are clear and provide an unbiased account of what is 
going on. Therefore, it is acceptable to provide a racial characteristic of someone who may have 
already committed a criminal act. The issue arises when someone who has not been proven to 
have committed a criminal act is profiled based upon their racial characteristic to have most 
likely committed a crime. It is not acceptable when a LEO states “A white man is the suspect of 
a murder” without eyewitness testimony, DNA, video, photographic, or any type of substantial 
evidence.  
To assist with the efforts in the War on Drugs, Operation Pipeline was born.50 Operation 
Pipeline, created in 1984, monitored highway systems because of the increasing number of drug 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 3.  
50 Ramierz, D.A, Hoopes, J., & Quinlan, T. L., Defining Racial Profiling in a Post September 11 World, CRIM. L. 
REV., 40(3), 1195-1239 (2003). 
  
14 
 
traffickers who established their networks within the U.S. borders. The DEA desired efficient 
cooperation between their organization and state and local LEOs. They also provided classes and 
materials to teach LEOs the interdiction laws and policies. The training classes focused on (1) 
the law, policy, and ethics governing highway stops and drugs and (2) drug trafficking trends and 
key characteristic, or indicators, that were shared by drug traffickers.51 
The DEA’s profile incorporated behavior cues, which led local and state law enforcement 
to become more aware of certain items in their surroundings. These items included: rental 
vehicles, out-of-state license plates, and tinted windows. In addition, the training of state and 
local police officers involved teaching them how to identify drug couriers based partly on race. 
Criminal profiling and typologies were eventually used to proactively prohibit crimes, which 
lead to disproportionate arrests and convictions of minorities.52 By the end of the 20th century, 
law enforcement methods of using race as the single or influencing factor to stop, search, and 
question minorities became known as racial profiling.53 Consequently, racial profiling shows 
more Hispanic-Americans and African-Americans are stopped, searched, and arrested during the 
War on Drugs, which has not been successful in winning the War on Drugs.54 Many people were 
not aware of this until victims of racial profiling began taking legal actions and filing complaints 
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against law enforcement agencies. As a result, the phrase, “driving while black,” was used to 
describe the disproportionate number of African-American drivers operating vehicles compared 
to the rate of African-American motorists stopped or searched.55 
Officers rarely kept accurate records of the stops made, which further complicated the 
issue. Therefore, when arrests were made and showed, disproportionately, Hispanic-Americans 
and African-Americans were arrested, it supported the idea that racial profiling worked.56 Critics 
of racial profiling were at a disadvantage because the data collected showed that the practice was 
at least somewhat effective and good policing. 
Many LEOs rely on race to decide who to stop and search. However, only a tiny 
proportion of people stopped and searched are drug traffickers.57 Many people in the drug units 
of law enforcement claim drug trafficking in the U.S. is dominated by Hispanic-Americans and 
African-Americans, but there is no evidence the drug culture in this country is dominated by 
Hispanic-Americans and African-Americans. In fact, a great majority of illicit drug users are 
white.58 Racial profiling on the highway produces no discernible benefit to interdict drug crimes. 
The War on Drugs has been fought with ambivalence and ambiguity.59 The idea of reducing drug 
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consumption by limiting the supply is failing.60 Racial profiling in the War on Drugs is 
ineffective because it requires searching hopelessly in a continuous stream of cars to eliminate 
drug traffickers.61 
War on Terror 
The War on Terror has been in effect since the 1920s. However, after the attacks of 9/11, 
the U.S. began to focus more on counterterrorism efforts and creating federal agencies 
specifically for that purpose, such as the DHS. As with WWII and the War on Drugs, the 
demands from society for better and safer neighborhoods brought about the need for law 
enforcement to use racial profiling to help with the War on Terror. The phrase “flying while 
brown” spins on “driving while black”, is used to represent the disproportional amount of Middle 
Easterners flying and walking compared to the number of Middle Easterners stopped, searched 
and detained since 9/11.62 
President George W. Bush declared that “…we must be mindful that as we seek to win 
the war that we treat Arab-Americans and Muslims with the respect they deserve.”63 Contrary to 
this statement, a little over a year after the attacks on 9/11, the government, through The USA 
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PATRIOT Act, created a “Special Registration.”64 The “Special Registration” required 
thousands of Middle Eastern men and boys with Visas from Middle Eastern countries to report to 
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) for questioning, fingerprinting, and 
photographing. If they did not report, they faced prosecution and deportation.65  
Without abandoning its statement on racial profiling, the DOJ created an exception for 
counterterrorism efforts. By 2003, the DOJ took a position where their “efforts to defend and 
safeguard against threats to the national security or integrity of the Nation’s borders were 
distinguishable from racial stereotyping in criminal investigations.”66 The “Special 
Registration,” by DOJ’s standards, is distinguishable. However, it still had a particular effect on 
southeastern Michigan. 
Southeastern Michigan has the largest concentration of Middle Eastern Americans and 
visitors in the country.67  Approximately 87% of residents were on the Justice Department’s 
initial interview list.68 Those who were contacted by letter received the following notification 
from the local U.S. Attorney and were asked to call the office by a given date to set up an 
interview appointment: 
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Your name was brought to our attention because, among 
other things, you came to Michigan on a visa from a 
country where there are groups that support, advocate, or 
finance international terrorism. We have no reason to believe 
that you are, in any way, associated with terrorist activities. 
Nevertheless, you may know something that could be helpful 
in our efforts.69 
 
The interview was described as completely voluntary. However, the recipients of the 
letter included people who were on visas from governments who were authoritarian and even 
considered abusive. Some recipients interpreted this letter as an order versus an option. Others, 
due to their immigration status, feared being detained, deported, denied citizenship and dreaded 
the unknown consequences for not doing the interview. 
In U.S. history, racial profiling has been consistently used to address national security 
and public safety issues. However, racial profiling has been an inappropriate and ineffective 
means to provide national security and public safety. The internment of Japanese-Americans was 
driven by racial prejudice and rumors. The War on Drugs was started to target Black people and 
“hippies.” It was unsuccessful in reducing the number of users and the amount of drugs entering 
the U.S. The War on Terror began after 9/11 to prevent terrorism. Likewise, the targeting of 
Middle Eastern people has limited the success of counterterrorism operations. Reviewing these 
three historical events, the use of racial profiling and its success in addressing national security 
and public safety concerns are notable. However, there are more effective ways that objectives 
could be met. The use of racial profiling as a method to protect the U.S. has preoccupied LEOs 
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and inhibited them from developing more reasonable and effective solutions, which is 
disadvantageous to the process of attaining national security and public safety. 
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UNITED STATES LAWS AND SUPREME COURT CASES 
Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act to combat terrorism after 9/11. In 2015, the act 
was replaced with the USA Freedom Act. The techniques used by LEOs are legally upheld 
through the sections and authorities created in these acts. In addition, United States federal and 
state Supreme Court cases have upheld race as a legal factor in certain situations, while others 
have not. 
USA PATRIOT Act and USA Freedom Act 
A commonly known counterterrorism legislation is the USA PATRIOT Act and, most 
recently the USA Freedom Act, which amends parts of it. George W. Bush signed the USA 
PATRIOT Act on October 26, 2001, less than two months after 9/11. The USA PATRIOT Act 
addressed many topics, including domestic security, protecting the border, and investigating 
terrorism.70  
Title I, domestic security, section 102 condemns discrimination against Arab and Muslim 
Americans.71 Title IV, protecting the border, exercises the right to use the entry and exit data 
program enacted by section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration 
Responsibility Act of 1996.72 It also authorizes the Attorney General to detain and certify any 
alien as a terrorist where there are reasonable grounds to believe he/she is affiliated with 
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designated terrorist organizations or engaged in terrorist activities.73 Title V, investigating 
terrorism, authorized LEOs to conduct surveillance and physical searches to investigate against 
terrorism.74 Each title provided ample room for profiling since it is up to LEOs, such as the 
Attorney General, to decide if there are reasonable grounds to link someone to a terrorist 
organization or action through data and physical searches.   
Since the USA PATRIOT Act was written in response to the September 11 attacks, in 
theory, it applies to all citizens, but it was written with Middle Eastern people in mind. In 
practice, it empowers law enforcement authorities to raid their homes, offices, and mosques in 
the name of the War on Terror.75 LEO’s authorities were given through the USA PATRIOT Act. 
14 years later, some authorities were deemed unfit for current counterterrorism efforts and were 
revised in the Freedom Act.76 
President Barack H. Obama signed The Freedom Act on June 2, 2015, a day after the 
USA PATRIOT Act expired. The act extended many parts of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 
but revised what civil liberties are protected, improved transparency and better information 
sharing with the American people, and strengthened national security in the USA PATRIOT 
Act.77  
                                                 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Geneive Abdo, Islam in America: Separate but Unequal, WASH. Q., 7, 12 (2005); Chrystie Flournoy Swiney, 
Racial Profiling of Arabs and Muslims in the US: Historical, Empirical, and Legal Analysis Applied to the War on 
Terrorism, MUSLIM WORLD JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS article 3 (2006). 
 
76 USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 2048, 114th Cong. 23 (2015).   
77 Id.   
  
22 
 
The revision included provisions to end bulk collection of private information, prevent 
government overreach, and allow challenges to national security gag orders. The end to bulk 
collection of private information was catalyzed by the ruling of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals on May 7, 2015. The court ruled that bulk collection of photo data is not authorized by 
federal law and is illegal.78 The act improves transparency and better information sharing with 
the American people through expert guidance at the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) court, declassification of FISA court opinions, and robust government and company 
reporting. FISA provides the government with the tools needed to strengthen national security. 
These tools include an increase of the statutory maximum prison sentence to 20 years, protection 
of the U.S.’s maritime activities from nuclear threats and other threats, enhancement of 
investigations of the international proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the provision 
of strictly limited emergency authorities. 
United States Supreme Court Cases 
U.S. federal and state Supreme Courts have allowed for interrogation and frisks without 
probable cause for an arrest providing that there is a reasonable basis for stop and frisks.79 
However, generally, the Supreme Courts have disallowed or limited the use of racial profiling. 
The reason is the lack of evidence of a reliable predictive value based on race when weighed 
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against the substantial intrusion upon civil liberties embodied by these types of policing 
measures.80 
In Terry v. Ohio, John W. Terry and Richard Chilton were frisked by a 39-year police 
officer because their activity in front of a jewelry store was suspicious.81 The officer found a gun 
in Terry’s and Chilton’s pockets.82 They were found guilty because of the suspicious nature of 
their behavior and the officer’s concern for his safety. Thereby, making the stop and frisk 
permissible.83 They appealed, but the Appellate court affirmed.84 Then, Terry appealed to the 
U.S. Supreme Court and they affirmed the ruling of the lower court.85 Terry v. Ohio expands the 
authority of officers to investigate crimes, including the use of racial profiling, where there is a 
reasonable basis for suspicion. 
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, the plaintiff and others were stopped on a major 
highway near the Mexican border at a routine, fixed, checkpoint for brief questioning about the 
occupants in the vehicle.86 The issue, in this case, was whether national security stops violate the 
Fourth Amendment’s proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures?87 The majority 
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concluded no. As long as there is reasonable suspicion an individual can be searched in the 
interest of public safety. In the majority opinion, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. writes: “The 
defendants note correctly that to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of 
individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure... But the 
Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.”88 The race of 
Martinez-Fuerte and the other individuals in the car, along with the location they came from, 
provided the reasonable suspicion required to be searched since it served the interest of keeping 
public safety. This Supreme Court case suggests, under the Fourth Amendment, it is 
constitutional to use race as one factor among several for a decision to stop a person, but not as 
the sole basis for such a decision. 
In Mustafa v. City of Chicago, Anna Mustafa sued police officers for false arrest and 
violation of her civil rights following an incident at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport.89 Mustafa was a 
56-year-old woman and an American citizen of Palestinian descent and Muslim faith.90 Three 
months following 9/11, Mustafa along with 19 of her immediate family members purchased 
tickets to fly to Europe to attend her father’s funeral.91 They also ordered “Muslim” meals.92 
Following, Mustafa was escorted to a bomb-detection machine to check her two pieces of 
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luggage, but officers failed to check her purse.93 When she realized it she said, “You already 
checked my luggage. Maybe I have a bomb in my purse. Nobody checked that.”94 Minutes later 
officers came to arrest Mustafa and she missed her father’s funeral.95 She was charged and later 
acquitted of a Felony - Disorderly Conduct-Bomb Threat pursuant to 720 Ill. Comp. Stat., 5/26-
1(a)(3).96 However, her claim of false arrest and violations of civil rights was denied because 
there was probable cause to arrest her.97 The two facts that led a reasonable person to believe a 
crime had been committed are (1) commotion and agitation with Mustafa at its center in an 
international airport and (2) Mustafa saying, “Maybe I have a bomb.”98 Regardless of the ruling, 
Mustafa was found not a risk. Therefore, racial profiling did not predict or prevent a terrorist 
attack. 
Two Supreme Court cases that stand out from the previous cases are United States v. 
Montero-Camargo and United States v. Avery. In United States v. Montero-Camargo, the court 
held that race may not be included in a profile used as a basis for individualized suspicion under 
the Fourth Amendment.99 In United States v. Avery, the court stated that the Equal Protection 
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all government actions.100 These actions include 
early stages of police investigations, such as non-coercive questioning, surveillance in public 
areas, and requesting consent to conduct searches that are not governed by the Fourth 
Amendment because they do not involve actual searches and seizures. Therefore, racial profiling 
may be challenged under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.101 Under 
general Equal Protection principles of the Fourteenth Amendment in the United States 
Constitution, it may be that racial profiling is generally prohibited in the absence of finding that 
its implication is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.102 An acceptable use of 
racial profiling can also be defined in how many innocent people are affected and treated. When 
stops and searches are truly narrowly tailored, then it makes sense to stop someone who is in the 
vicinity at the time a particular crime is committed or if evidence can place the person within a 
time frame. 
Much of the federal legislation immigrants, non-immigrant aliens, and travelers are 
subjected to, are designed to proactively prevent terrorism and provides evidence on a federal 
level that racial profiling is not encouraged. However, there are circumstances when the Supreme 
Court will allow it. The responsibility falls on each law enforcement agency who interpret 
policies and laws based upon their inherent bias, which will be discussed in the solutions section 
of this thesis. 
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 EFFECTIVENESS 
The trend of racial profiling has continued from WWII into the War on Terror. The 
counterterrorism actions executed have acted as deterrents, not preventions, of some terrorist 
attacks. While deterrents and disruptions are helpful, the ultimate goal is to prevent terrorism. 
However, current counterterrorism operations are not as effective as they set out to be. As a 
result, terrorists continue to recruit, and acts of terrorism continue to occur worldwide. 
The process to determine the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts is complex but not 
impossible. Goals of each agency, as well as goals within a mission, are different, which means 
the degrees of effectiveness are constantly changing. As a result, different uses of profiling are 
not easily transferable from one agency to another. The definition and standard of effectiveness 
should be uniform so that all LEOs can use it in their daily operations. Effectiveness can be 
defined in many ways. Arguably, effectiveness in the terms of counterterrorism can be the degree 
of success in the prevention of harm through deterrence or incapacitation.103 
Using race to find a criminal can be effective in two ways: 
(1) If reliable witnesses report that they saw a white man 
running from the scene of a murder and going into a bar in which 
there are only three white men, the police have enough information 
to detain all three-“reasonable suspicion”-and they might have 
probable cause to arrest them as well. If there is only one white 
man in the bar, there might just be enough to convict by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.104 
(2) While a suspect's race alone is never proof of guilt, a 
suspect's race is frequently powerful evidence of innocence. If the 
eyewitnesses to a murder are right and the killer was a white man 
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that is conclusive evidence of the innocence of any person who is 
black, or a woman. (The witnesses could in theory be mistaken, but 
even so the police are justified in treating their description as very 
strong evidence of innocence of any person of the wrong race or 
sex.)105 This may be the real reason why courts uniformly agree 
that police officers may rely on racially specific descriptions of 
criminal suspects, despite the prohibition against the use of racial 
classification.106 
 
While this explanation provides effective uses of racial profiling, the effectiveness of 
racial profiling is further complicated. The complication arises because the civil rights of 
individuals are being compromised when entire classes of people are broadly and vaguely 
defined as Middle Eastern in appearance. This definition encompasses not only those of Middle 
Eastern descent, but also South Asians, Mediterranean peoples, Hispanic-Americans, African-
Americans, and generally “brown” people.107 The threat against the U.S. is broad and not from a 
narrow racial group, but an extreme subset of one of the major religions in the world.108 The 
current criteria fails to separate Muslim extremists from other identifiers by including non-
Middle Eastern, non-Arab, non-extremist people and a vast majority of peaceful and law-abiding 
Middle Eastern Muslims.109 Decisions on whether profiling is appropriate or not are clearly 
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arbitrary, which undermines citizens who are Middle Eastern in appearance and their ability to 
be secure in the protections provided by the U.S. justice system.110 
Terrorist Diversity 
A key sign of the ineffectiveness of current counterterrorism operations is the expansion 
of terrorist recruitment to include many different races, ethnicities, and religions. Society has 
also become aware of the terrorists’ motives, actions, and variety.  Recently, a group of 
protestors took over a building in a federal wildlife refuge in Oregon.111 There has not been an 
official consensus of labeling those actions as terrorist activity; however, it is arguable that if the 
group, was made up of Muslims and/or of people who look Middle Eastern, the event would 
have been labeled a terrorist attack and ended swiftly by guns and/or raid of the building.112 
The group who occupied the Oregon federal wildlife refuge building were armed, anti-
government extremists. They announced that they were willing to kill or be killed.113 LEOs did 
not have a massive reaction. Also, the media did not provide a minute by minute coverage 
detailing the political, religious, and overall personal backgrounds of the terrorists. The LEOs’ 
response was that it was a protest by “militia members” not terrorists and that they were looking 
for a peaceful end. However, the FBI defines domestic terrorism as activities that: 
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…involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal 
or state law; appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and 
occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.114 
 
The actions by the “militia members” fall under section (ii) of this definition of domestic 
terrorism. Yet, since they did not fit the Middle Eastern racial profile, they were not treated as 
though they participated in any of the actions stated in the definition of domestic terrorism. 
The Oregon terrorists were not the only ones who did not fit the stereotypical mold of 
terrorists. Richard Reid, the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to board a plane with explosives in 
his shoes, had a British mother and a Jamaican father.115 Timothy McVeigh was a white, 
American militia terrorist who bombed the Oklahoma City Federal building. John Walker Lindh, 
the American-born Taliban soldier raised in Marin County, California, was convicted based on 
his activities with Al Qaeda.116 Aafia Siddiqui, a mother of three with a degree from MIT, was 
on the FBI's most wanted terrorist list until her capture in 2008.117 In 2009, a black Nigerian man 
named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab was arrested for attempting to blow up a Detroit-bound 
transatlantic airliner.118 Colleen LaRose, a white, blonde American woman nicknamed Jihad 
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Jane, was arrested for her involvement in a terrorist assassination plan.119 Also, many local 
domestic terrorists were white males whose combined terroristic acts resulted in hundreds of 
deaths. They include the Atlanta Centennial Olympic bomber and the Unabomber.120 The 
stereotyping and profiling of those who are or appear to be Middle Eastern as a terrorist can no 
longer be the main indicator of a terrorist. 
Some terrorist organizations have become diverse and recruit members from all over the 
world in multiple demographic groups, which does not align completely with the law 
enforcement strategy profile. Even though there is a history of terrorists in the U.S. not being 
Middle Eastern, many LEOs still racial profile those who are Middle Eastern as terrorists. Many 
terrorists were not caught before their attacks because they did not match the “terrorist profile” 
even though their actions leading up to the attacks were reflective of typical terrorist activities.121 
Consistency 
Consistency in counterterrorism operations can help accomplish counterterrorism goals 
more effectively and efficiently without using racial profiling. In WWII, the War on Drugs, and 
the War on Terror, LEOs have been criticized for not being consistent about who they stop, 
search, and detain. The Oregon terrorist attack that occurred in January of 2016 is an example of 
this premise. In this situation, the typical counterterrorism response used when an individual is 
suspected of domestic terrorism was not employed. Consistency also encompasses how close 
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local law enforcement agencies are following national counterterrorism laws. Unfortunately, 
organizations that use racial profiling as a primary reason to stop, search, seize, and detain do not 
keep records on how consistently useful racial profiling has been over the years. 
However, recently TSA has shown they have developed consistent security measures, 
regardless of the demographic of the individual being searched. For example, a 10-year-old girl 
was patted down extensively for having a juice box larger than the three ounces allowed on an 
aircraft.122 She and her father made a public statement on the news about how invading and 
humiliating the process was, and there was a public outrage over the incident. Society must come 
to understand that what happened to the 10-year-old girl happens to countless people who are 
profiled daily.  
Even though TSA has become more thorough in their secondary searches, there is a gap 
in their counterterrorism operations. The TSA Pre-check is a gap. It assumes a particular person 
is a low-risk threat to national security and public safety. The program only considers those who 
may qualify as low-risk to receive expedited screening. On their website, they clearly list the 
advantages of participating in this program:  you do not need to remove your shoes, laptops, 3-1-
1 liquids, belts, or light jackets.123 The 3-1-1 rule applies to aerosols, gels, and liquids to be in 
containers no larger than three ounces. All three-ounce containers must be in one clear plastic re-
sealable bag and each passenger is allowed one. These advantages are ideal for those who fit the 
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low-risk profile, but are a disadvantage for all other airport travelers because these types of 
people could very well perform acts of terrorism. Yet, because they do not fit the Middle Eastern 
profile or are frequent business traveler they are overlooked.  
Through the TSA Pre-check, children 12 and under are allowed to travel with an eligible 
parent or guardian. This provides the opportunity for the eligible person to use children as a 
terrorist weapon or place terrorist weapons in the travel bags of children. The assumptions made 
by these types of programs do not allow for fully effective counterterrorism efforts.124 
Many Americans were frightened because the terrorists on 9/11 were Middle Easterners, 
which in the U.S. is a minority group.125 Therefore, racial profiling as part of investigating 
terrorism has been largely tolerated. Typically, racially motivated security measures are accepted 
along with aggressive measures when they target small and disempowered groups such as racial 
minorities and foreigners.126 Consistency in counterterrorism operations is not accepted as much 
as racial profiling. If consistent measures were applied to all people regardless of races, 
ethnicities, etc. then, terrorism can be prevented, and there would be more public engagement in 
counterterrorism measures. 
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SOLUTIONS 
Racial profiling in counterterrorism efforts has been ineffective in preventing terrorism. 
Terrorists have made it difficult to quantify the value of a life compared to the varying degrees of 
harm associated with the improper use of race in counterterrorism efforts.127 This is especially 
true when the perpetrators devalue their lives and the lives of others.128 There is a need for 
reformation of training and policies that govern the actions of LEOs. LEOs should be trained to 
use facts instead of implicit biases to help counterterrorism efforts. Along with training, policies 
should be enacted to reinforce objectivity instead of subjectivity. It is inevitable that any type of 
screening process might be viewed as profiling. However, if we allow race to be a lesser of many 
criteria or requirements, it will mitigate its effect on people.  
The tools we already have can prevent terrorist attacks on American soil. The laws, 
regulations, body scanners, x-rays, and LEOs have been effective so far in deterring terrorist 
activity.129 However, the current system is not perfect and a failure of it can cost many lives. 
Therefore, exploring options to make it better is worth it. 
Training 
When dealing with people, it is important to recognize that although people are a nation’s 
greatest asset, there must be an effort to decrease human error. The best possible way to improve 
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the human aspect of counterterrorism efforts is by removing inherent biases people have and 
implementing policies that do not support the use of inherent biases.130  
There is not a single or fool-proof way to solving this issue. However, a step in the right 
direction requires, at minimum, a full day of training given to all LEOs to help them objectively 
perform their jobs/careers.131 The day should consist of helping participants recognize their 
biases through tests and conducting procedures in small groups. Finally, each participant should 
have the opportunity to create a presentation reflecting on their biases and where the logic for 
their biases originated.  
Biases develop at a young age, are reinforced as we grow up, and are perpetuated through 
experiences, conformity, and the media.132 When biases are learned, people are resistant to 
change even when the evidence does not support them; they embrace and isolate evidence that 
supports their biases.133 Media and television consistently use biases to convey moods, scenes, 
and characters.134 There is mental residue, hidden negative biases, even if someone is working to 
behave without them.135 Since biases are an innate human trait used for survival to determine 
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friend or foe, it is reasonable to see why the categorization of people happens so easily.136 The 
schema is a stereotype, which turns into prejudice and then into discrimination.137  
Requiring individuals who will be LEOs to take tests such as Harvard University’s, the 
University of Virginia’s, and University of Washington’s Implicit Association Tests (IAT) will 
help individuals to first recognize they have an implicit or hidden bias.138 The tests consist of 
categories to choose from including Race (black-white), Arab/Muslims, Gender, and many more 
to measure unconscious biases. It allows the test taker to experience their hidden biases as the 
test is conducted. One’s reaction time to a set of people and characteristics will bring 
unconscious biases into one’s consciousness.  
To demonstrate the way the IAT works, we will use the Arab-Muslim IAT category.  The 
task of the participant is to associate good words (peace, happy, glorious, etc.) and bad words 
(nasty, evil, hurt, etc.) with both Arab-Muslims and Other People of nationalities or religion. The 
association the participant responds more quickly with, such as Arab-Muslim with bad words 
and Other People with good words, shows bias.  The reaction is measured in milliseconds, and 
when the participant completes the task they receive a rating of “strong”, “moderate”, or “slight”. 
There are critics of the IAT test, such as Texas A&M University psychologist Hart Blanton, 
Ph.D. Blanton highlights a weakness, the way the test is scored.139 The IAT provides feedback 
                                                 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Brian Nosek, Mahzarin Banaji, and Tony Greenwald, Project Implicit, (2011), 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/selectatest.html. 
 
139 Beth Azar, IAT: Fad or fabulous?, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, (July/August 2008), Vol 39, No. 7 , 44, 
http://www.apa.org/monitor/2008/07-08/psychometric.aspx. 
  
37 
 
with a failing psychometric, which Blanton believes is an arbitrary metric.140 However, the IAT 
test has been validated by research.141 From the years of research, general findings indicate (1) 
implicit biases are persuasive, (2) most people are often unaware of them, (3) implicit biases 
predict behavior, and (4) people differ in levels of implicit bias.142 
The next step would be to break the training participants into small groups to discuss and 
perform scenarios. The scenarios could consist of one individual who is required to stop, search, 
and detain three to five life-size cutouts of people. The cutouts vary in sex, race, and outward 
religious attire.  Each scenario is filmed and feedback is provided. Feedback questions would 
include:  How well did you think you conducted the search? Were you aware of the changes in 
your facial expressions, the search techniques you used, and how closely you searched the 
person? How did performing this search make you feel? Where did your biases come from? How 
did they influence your action? What can we do about them? The first person to give feedback 
will be the individual who performed the procedures. The next would be from their peers. The 
last would be from their small group supervisor. Afterwards, participants would re-watch the 
scenario through film to discuss and determine the extent to which feedback corresponded 
appropriately with actions taken. 
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Once participants have completed these steps, they would create a final presentation to 
present to their classmates. It will be a reflection on what they learned about their types of biases, 
the history of where they may have begun and been reinforced, the results of the small group 
scenarios, and the steps they can take to mitigate or eliminate their implicit bias.  
The goal of these activities is to help participants become more aware of what their 
implicit biases are and how they can fix it to be better LEOs and overall better people. When 
people become aware of their hidden biases, if they desire, they can monitor their behavior and 
play close attention to verbal language, body language, and stigmatizations of target groups.143 A 
conscious decision to change can lead someone to reduce their unconscious biases.144 
Policy 
To mitigate the improper use of race in counterterrorism operations, policies should be 
created, enacted, and enforced to be a reference for authorities to use and help to clarify how to 
appropriately adhere to policies. Policies should explain what LEOs are doing, why they are 
doing it, and how it helps to achieve the agency’s overall mission. In Dr. Fridell’s book, Racially 
Biased Policing: The Law Enforcement Response to Implicit Black-Crime Association, she 
present ideal policies to be created to ensure certain criteria are met in order to stop, search, 
seize, interdict, or detain based upon race.145 She presents three policy models: 
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(1) The race or ethnicity of an individual shall not be the 
sole factor in determining the existence of probable cause to place 
in custody or arrest an individual or in constituting a reasonable 
and articulable suspicion that an offense has been or is being 
committed so as to justify the detention of an individual or the 
investigatory stop of a motor vehicle.146 
(2) Officers may not consider the race or ethnicity of a 
person in the course of any law enforcement action unless the 
officer is seeking to detain, apprehend, or otherwise be on the 
lookout for a specific suspect sought in connection with a specific 
crime who has been identified or described in part by race or 
ethnicity.147 
(3) Officers shall not consider race/ethnicity to establish 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause except that officers may 
take into account the reported race/ethnicity of a potential 
suspect(s) based on trustworthy, locally relevant information that 
links a person or persons of a specific race/ethnicity to a particular 
unlawful incident(s).148 
 
The first policy is a Connecticut statute on racial profiling and it reflects the “solely 
model”. This policy provides a loophole because if a LEO were to stop a Middle Eastern man for 
having a liquid over the allowed amount at an airport, but leaves a white man alone for the same 
issue, it is not violating a “solely model” policy. The decision was based on race and another 
factor (race and violation of airport liquid policy). The second and third policies mandate a LEO 
to show the link between identifiers, such as race, and the certain suspect who was stopped, 
searched, detained, and arrested. For example, if an eyewitness describes the terrorist suspect by 
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race, physical description, and clothing then, race, along with the other identifiers, can be used as 
a means to stop, search, detain, and arrest. 
Another suggested policy would be that LEOs may wear body cameras with vocal 
recordings at all times during their shift. This would not only monitor inherent biases, but it 
would also show questionable force used absent of imminent danger. In airports across the 
country, TSA officers screen passengers through X-rays and bag checks. One person is in a room 
only looking at the screen and tells the front line people when they need to check a person or 
bag. Unfortunately, the thoroughness of the search is not 100% certain because the front line 
person is performing a secondary search on different categories of people. Training on how all 
secondary searches should be conducted can help ensure each officer is performing the same 
secondary search on every “flagged” individual regardless of race, gender, age, etc. Camera 
recordings can provide evidence that searches are happening the way they should. 
With monitoring, there must be a level of autonomy with LEOs. Camera or video footage 
should only be used when the person monitoring believes there is a consistent use of biases by 
the LEO conducting stops and searches and/or when someone complains about being racially 
profiled while a stop and/or search was conducted on them. Accountability within each LEO 
must be established through the organizational culture. The culture may be, to be honest, truthful, 
and loyal to the position, the organization, and its mission.   
In addition, if a LEO has profiled and there is a correlation between the profiling and the 
implicit bias test results then, they enter a graduated consequence system. The system would be 
tailored to each organization’s capabilities. However, here is an example of what it may look 
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like. The first instance, the LEO is given a verbal warning and must go through immediate 
retraining. The second instance, they are given a written warning and probation from that 
particular job in the company. They will receive a night shift job that does not require them to 
work on the front lines, so they may still earn their pay. The third instance, they are suspended 
without pay for three days. The consequences are worsened by how many times the offense is 
made. In contrast to the graduated consequence system, LEOs, who consistently perform their 
job objectively with little to no implicit biases, will enter a graduated reward system. This system 
would be tailored to each organization’s capabilities as well. Each month the LEO performs well 
he/she will receive recognition on the organization’s monthly award board. When he/she has 
consistently performed for three months, in addition to the board recognition, he/she will receive 
a $50 restaurant gift card. At six months, he/she will receive a $100 Visa gift card. The incentive 
will start over each year, but as long as he/she is performing consistently the incentives will be 
provided. Even if the organizations cannot offer financial incentives, they should still offer 
something that motivates their members. This may motivate people to adhere to policies since it 
can affect their livelihood. 
Policy making requires research and time. However, there are important questions to 
answer when writing and enacting policy that can help prevent racial profiling in U.S. 
Counterterrorism. Thereby, making it more effective. Was race or other discriminatory factors 
the motive to stop, search, and detain someone? Was that suspect treated with respect throughout 
the entire process? Is the manner designed to discover relevant information that is freely given? 
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LIMITATIONS 
Limitations of this thesis include: racial profiling provides deterrence, the attackers of 
9/11 were Middle Easterners, and a survey with analyzed data could have been conducted 
specifically for this thesis. Although racial profiling is inadequate in preventing terrorism, it 
provides deterrence.149 However, if the ultimate goal is to prevent terrorism and terrorist are only 
deterred, research must be done to find more effective and progressive ways to combat and 
prevent terrorism.  
Also, the attackers of 9/11 were Middle Easterners and following the attacks racial 
profiling was justified. On July 31st, 2012, the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) 
Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, stated Sunni Extremists were responsible for the greatest 
amount of worldwide terrorist attacks and fatalities for the third consecutive year in a row.150 
Sunni Extremists committed about 56% of all attacks and about 70% of all fatalities, globally.151 
Sunni is a branch of the Muslim religion and 85%-90% of the world’s Muslim population is 
Sunnis.152 Most Sunnis live in the Middle East and makeup of 90% or more of Egypt’s, Jordan’s, 
and Saudi Arabia’s populations.153 In the NCTC’s most recent report in 2014, they list five 
organizations as the top perpetrators of worldwide terrorist attacks who have ties to Middle 
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Eastern nations: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Taliban, Al-Shabaab, Boko 
Haram, and Maoists/Communist Party of India-Maoist.154 However, there is a lack of available, 
current, and reliable statistical information to determine if in the last few years racial profiling is 
adequate in preventing terrorism in the U.S.  
In addition, a survey and analyzing of data specifically for the purpose of this thesis was 
not conducted. Ideally, a survey would be sent out to organizations such as the TSA and DHS 
asking if they racial profile in their counterterrorism operations. The follow-up question would 
be: how effective it has been along with statistical data on the race of terrorist they deterred or 
captured? The survey would provide evidence that racial profiling is either adequate or not based 
upon quantifiable and qualifiable evidence.  
Many people profile, it is apparent. Even children profile unfamiliar adults as dangerous 
strangers and are taught to know the difference. These limitations make racial profiling 
compelling but it is ineffective and the law does not support it. It is not accepted unless there is 
probable cause or another justified reasoning.155 
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CONCLUSION 
There is not a clear-cut answer to the improper use of race within U.S. counterterrorism 
efforts. A clear, quantifiable answer may not be feasible when there is ample room for the 
subjective weighing of many outcomes to racial profiling.156 Critics of racial profiling argue that 
profiling violates fundamental civil rights.157 While advocates of racial profiling contend that 
those rights must bend concerning public safety and the prevention of a catastrophic loss of 
lives.158 The costs and benefits need to be balanced. Informed decisions can be made when 
provided with the proper training. While U.S. counterterrorism can be modified to be less 
intrusive, they provide deterrents, and it would be foolish to eliminate those provisions 
completely. 
Steps have been made in the right direction where screening processes, such as TSA’s 
Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT), have been expanded by 
incorporating more nonracial factors, so race is only one measure and not the main factor.159 
Race, together with other information about the suspect, can form a pattern that is persuasive to 
any degree.160 Race should be one of many investigative factors, not a determinative one, to aid 
in counterterrorism efforts. Other informative measures that have been added are travel patterns, 
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professional or familial connections, criminal records, financial history, and affiliations with 
other groups and individuals.161 This allows LEOs to make the most informed decisions through 
holistic information about an individual. 
It is achievable to determine if LEOs are using racial profiling to operate on a general 
assumption that Middle Eastern people, especially men, commit acts of terror, or if they are 
pursuing specific information about the 9/11 attacks to prevent terrorist attacks. Also, when 
LEOs are combating terrorism they may not know how to separate or distinguish the two 
conditions. Redefining the group of people who are deemed more likely to be a terrorist, through 
actions, not race, and creating the balance between security and civil rights will ensure the 
overall integrity of the system for all parties involved. Inevitably, there will be individual cases 
where racial profiling issues will come into play. However, the system must work in favor of the 
group so individual cases are less likely.162  
Society and law enforcement, including the DHS, respond to each other in a variety of 
ways. The reoccurring trend is if society requests stronger national security measures then, law 
enforcement responds with strengthened security measures. However, many times, this means 
racial profiling is used in order to aid in combating crimes. The effectiveness of profiling has yet 
to be scientifically proven, although surveys and hypothetical equations to calculate the 
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effectiveness have been conducted.163 The results did not validate or invalidate racial profiling as 
effective.164 
Attitudes regarding racial profiling in the name of preventing terrorism are contingent on 
one’s mission, training, and work environment. LEOs have a duty to maintain security, prevent 
crime, enforce the law, and conduct counterterrorism operations. They are responsible if they fail 
to do any of these. General society does not have these responsibilities. Consequently, LEOs 
would more likely see some value in being able to recognize suspicious terrorist behavior 
coupled with a more probable physical description in a security-sensitive situation. 
Training individuals to recognize and eliminate personal biases will be a key aspect of 
solving racial profiling in counterterrorism efforts. Testing, active participation in scenarios, and 
retention of policies that prohibit racial profiling in counterterrorism efforts will aid in the 
solution. The issue of racial profiling is generational and contingent upon the tragedies that 
catalyze LEOs to perform the duties they swore to do. 
Since 9/11, the fear of future terrorist attacks heightened investigation because of the 
seriousness of the threat. With that and the identity of the terrorists, the government was justified 
in its initial investigations focused on Middle Eastern men; although it provided anxiety and pain 
to those who fit the profile. However, 15 years later, it is no longer justified with the changes to 
who the terrorists recruit, what they believe, and their capabilities. The individuals impacted by 
9/11 or raised with the stigmatizing of Middle Eastern people have been subjected to the biases 
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of who commit terrorist attacks. Unfortunately, this is a harder change to make, but it is 
achievable through retroactive training. 
The government must now operate with appropriate reasoning and adequate information. 
Racial profiling is no less complicated or troubling. Therefore, we must have a deep suspicion of 
it. The consequences of negative stereotypes are discrimination, stigmatization, and the 
overlooking of other groups. This can cause investigators to more likely suspect criminal 
behavior in targeted groups. It is dangerous for LEOs to investigate in this way because it 
deprives the rights of and degrades the targeted group. It also affects split-second, life or death 
decisions. The starting point to prevent the improper use of race is the presumption that no one 
racial group should be considered more suspicious or dangerous than another. More research 
should be conducted to provide a new alternative to the issue of racial profiling in national 
security efforts. Profiling can be based upon other information, such as behavior and childhood 
experiences instead of race because they provide more evidence of who is likely to commit a 
crime.165 
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